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SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Louis B. Sohn*
The problem we have been discussing is not a new one. Before we try to
make recommendations for the future we need to take a look at the past.
The crucial issue is who really makes international law. Jordan Paust told
us that it would be very dangerous to leave the making of international law
to states, especially where human rights are concerned. The very purpose of
the law in this case is to protect individuals against the states. But who
would make it instead? I submit that states really never make international
law on the subject of human rights. It is made by the people that care; the
professors, the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of articles
in leading international law journals. If you go to the State Department and
they have a question, where do they find the answer? If they find it in Ms.
Whiteman's Digest, they consider that they have solved the problem. If the
index does not mention the issue, the smart ones look at chapter titles and
try to figure out where she has hidden it. Once they discover the right place,
they find a smorgasbord of alternatives, as she included everything she could
find on a particular subject in one place. That way the researcher does not
necessarily discover a consistent rule, but can see what options are available.
In principle, what has happened, of course, is that each generation relied
on its predecessors. In the medieval times, the postglossators, such as
Bartolus de Sassoferrato, looked at everything that was written before them,
going back to the Roman days and beyond, whether or not it was really
relevant, quoting the Bible or the Code of Justinian, or maybe even the
Koran, picking out appropriate phrases, and proclaiming that this is
international law as practiced by states.
Then came Vittoria, Suarez, and Grotius, and they looked at the medieval
writings and said "oh, yes, those are the rules of international law on the
subject." States provided the precedents, but had nothing to do with this
law-crystallizing process. These "fathers of international law" were followed
by a few more, such as Vattel. He found that many of these books by then
became so top-heavy, so incomprehensible, that nobody wanted to use them.
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To remedy this, he wrote in more accessible French, not Latin, a clearly
written book (in modem phraseology a "nutshell") on international law,
which became very popular. If you look at British courts, American courts,
German courts, of the nineteenth century, Vattel is always cited. Later in
France, England and the United States, domestic books were written on the
international law precedents as applied by that country. For instance, in the
United States, Francis Wharton, John Basset Moore, Green H. Hackworth,
and, as mentioned already, Marjorie M. Whiteman wrote digests of U.S. law,
as did Charles Cheney Hyde in his treatise. There were also popular
treatises in other countries, as Europeans trust eminent professors more than
they trust courts. E.g., in England, Sir Robert Phillimore, William Edward
Hall, John Westlake, and Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim wrote books
reflecting the British approach; and in France, P. Pradier-Fod6rd, Henry
Bonfils, Paul Fauchille, Georges Scelle, and Charles Rousseau wrote about
French law. If there are such excellent books, is there any need to look
further?
Now everybody looks back, looks at these books or their later editions,
such as Lauterpacht's, or now Jennings' Oppenheim. These authors did the
research; we do not have time to do any new research, as the decision-
makers want instant response. In particular, this is often happening in the
State Department. I was there for a year and a half as the first Counselor on
International Law. One of my duties was to help people find international
law if they needed help. One day, a young man came rushing to me saying,
"We have invaded Laos. The Secretary just found out about it and wants to
know whether there are any precedents?" I told him that there were at least
two precedents.
The two I was able to give him immediately were, first, the decision of a
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal after the First World War, about Germany bombing
Salonica because the British were using it as a base for attacking the Turkish
Straits. There was the great attempt by Churchill to close down the
Mediterranean, and he disregarded Greek neutrality. The Germans did not
like it, as Turkey was their ally, and they bombed Salonica, destroying some
British ships, but also a part of the city. The tribunal said that because
Greece violated neutrality by permitting the British to use its harbor, Greece
could not complain that its harbor was bombed.
The second case happened during the Second World War. This time, the
Germans captured a British ship on the high seas and, in order to take their
prize back to Germany, they thought it would be safer to use the Norwegian
territorial waters, as Norway was a neutral at that time. The British navy
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went, however, into the territorial waters of Norway and recaptured the ship.
Norway complained about it and the British said that they were sorry, but as
Norway violated its neutrality by permitting Germany to use its waters to
smuggle back that ship, it must suffer the consequences. The assistant to the
Legal Adviser found the books quoting these cases, and, without further
research, was able to say to him that there were two good cases. The Legal
Adviser two days later made a speech saying, of course this is legal under
international law, look at the legal history. There are two cases, and now we
have a third one. This is the way international law is made, not by states,
but by "silly" professors writing books, and by knowing where there is a
good book on the subject. What I am trying to say is that, at most, you can
say that international law is made by the legal advisers of Foreign Offices,
relying sometimes on contributions of the Justice Department or other
departments, and depending very much on learned authors, not on a search
of archives.
By now there is also a second way, as we have discovered over the last
few days, namely that courts can decide what international law is. Though,
of course, if you read the courts' decisions, they did not do the original
research. They read the books, and cite the books, so it really goes back to
the first source. Very often the best opinions were written by professors who
were appointed international arbitrators. It is only in the 19th Century that
we started getting a relatively large number of international decisions on
what is a very narrow part of international law, relating to the rights of
foreigners, states taking away foreign property, people getting injured, etc.
Foreigners with states that were willing to intervene on their behalf and to
persuade the alleged violators of international law, often by force or threat
of force, to at least go to a tribunal; and the tribunal then made the law.
That is the way international law was made in the 19th century. We have
inherited that and we have agreed that law is made by the practice of states,
i.e., by their Foreign Offices and by decisions of courts, domestic and
international, collected and crystallized by professors; but we added to it a
third source: treaties. As was pointed out yesterday, there are more and
more treaties. Up to the end of the 19th century, these were primarily
bilateral treaties. Nevertheless, many general rules developed incidentally
because of the fact that States were concluding very similar, if not identical
treaties, on the subjects of commerce and navigation. To these we have
added treaties on investment and those treaties in a way continue the
tradition of the old ones. If you look at ten American treaties, ten British
treaties, or ten Swiss treaties on these subjects, practically in every aspect of
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them, they say more or less the same thing. As a result, Asian and African
countries started concluding similar treaties among themselves because they
also wanted to protect their investments in other states. Thus, international
law can be created as well by concurrent bilateral treaties.
I discovered how this process works when one of my students at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (at which I taught from time to
time), who was supposed to write his doctoral dissertation under my
supervision, could not decide on a subject. So, he came to me finally, and
I told him that I have not seen any book analyzing the hundreds of treaties
on consular relations. In addition, practically every state has a consular law.
"Why don't you look at those things, and see how many common principles
you can find?" Initially, he wasn't pleased with the topic, but finally
prepared a big volume analyzing many treaties on the subject, and added
some notes on relevant legislation and judicial decisions. As a result, the
International Law Commission of the United Nations decided that the subject
was ripe for codification, and the U.N. Secretariat hired him to help them
prepare the materials for the Commission. That is how we got a beautiful,
widely ratified convention on consular law; it was made possible because
somebody was able to write a comprehensive book on international consular
relations. Another source of international law was thus legitimized.
The next strange development was, of course, that states started conclud-
ing multilateral treaties. First, we had treaties in the field of communications
and other technical areas, e.g., the treaties that established the Universal
Postal Union, and the telegraph, telephone and radio unions which later
merged into the International Telecommunication Union. The one I always
liked was the Metric Union that created the sacred meter that is held
someplace in Paris; against it we have to measure one we keep in the United
States in order to make sure that we have a uniform measurement.
Next, thanks to the initiative of Tsar Nicholas II, the Hague Conventions
codified suddenly all the law of war in a set of conventions, first in 1899,
and second in 1907, and were supplemented in 1929 by the four Geneva
Conventions on humanitarian law. The ambitious attempt of codification by
the League of Nations in 1930 was, however, less successful and resulted in
only one treaty on the law of nationality. Many other multilateral treaties
were, however, concluded between the two World Wars and Manley Hudson
collected them in nine thick volumes of International Legislation.
In the United Nations, we moved further in that direction. During the last
50 years, some 300 treaties, i.e., about six treaties per year, have been
concluded under the auspices of the United Nations. In addition, other
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organizations, both global and regional, have approved large numbers of
multilateral treaties; the leader is the International Labor Organization which
adopted recently its 150th treaty. What is the meaning and impact of this
proliferation of treaties? Yesterday we struggled a little, not really in depth,
with the relationship between treaties and customary law. Some are saying
that these treaties are representative of the best view of the delegates of
many governments on what the rule of law on a particular subject is or
should be. People have trouble with distinguishing these two concepts,
whether something "is" or "should be." The International Law Commission
was supposed to distinguish very clearly between codifying the law that is
and developing the law that should be. It refused to do it; it could not be
done. States do not like to waste time; when they work hard in order to
agree on a treaty, the result must be of some importance. In addition to the
agreements concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, about 4,000
other treaties have been registered with the United Nations. This is more
than was done in the previous 4,000 years; this sudden increase means that
international law is now being made almost every day.
When the International Court started struggling with the Law of the Sea
Treaty, it took a long time for the Court to act. When states first asked the
Court to apply immediately the Law of the Sea being developed by the
United Nations, the Court said that the U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea had not yet agreed upon it. The Court could, of course, consider the
options being discussed, but it could not yet derive a principle from them.
However, a few years later, the Court said that this law was now crystallized.
It was not yet ratified by anybody, in fact it was not yet signed by anybody,
but the Court said it was crystallized. There was a disagreement on a
separable issue of deep seabed mining, but on everything else there was a
clear consensus. The lack of ratifications was not a problem. A new rule
has emerged: even an unratified treaty can be applied if there was a
consensus.
In an earlier case relating to the law of treaties a similar approach was
taken. The International Court of Justice, the Supreme Court of the United
States, and the State Department all said that the law of treaties was codified
by the Vienna Convention of 1969. It was not ratified by many states, but
it was a good, well-liked (except by Professor McDougal from Yale),
relatively clearly written convention, and constitutes the best evidence of
what the law is today. When the State Department received an inquiry from
a federal court asking, "Is this really the law?", as it was told by lawyers that
the United States has not yet ratified this treaty, the Department replied that
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this Convention reflects customary international law which is binding on the
United States. The court accepted this statement and applied it accordingly.
The International Court of Justice did the same when the issue of applicabili-
ty of the Law of Treaties Convention was raised in a case before it.
Another new development originated in the United Nations. The Security
Council can adopt binding decisions, but the General Assembly can adopt
only recommendations. In 1948 the Assembly adopted, however, a
declaration. What is the difference? Recommendations are not binding, and
it was argued that recommendations are about as far as the Assembly can go.
Others claimed that declarations don't deal with particular disputes, but
represent a common view of the state representatives of the world. (At this
point, there are only one or two states staying out of the United Nations;
they are not members, but they participate as observers in almost everything.
Membership does not matter too much, as they only lack a vote, one of more
than 180 in the Assembly. Their non-voting status does not detract from the
universality of the Assembly.) This great assembly of states gets together
and starts working on an issue. After several years, after many revisions
taking account of everybody's views, it reaches a consensus. A law-making
declaration is adopted. Unfortunately, a London professor, Bin Cheng, at
one time wrote that the United Nations declarations constitute "instant"
international law, which to many uninitiated politicians meant that it was
adopted suddenly, without sufficient discussion, and was merely an
ephemeral statement.
In reality, however, every one of these declarations was worked out over
years: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights took three years before
it was done; the Declaration relating to Friendly Relations took eight years;
some other declarations took more than ten. What is important is that at the
end of all these deliberations, an agreement was reached and was adopted by
consensus. There were, however, some difficulties. In the 19th General
Assembly, Russia was three years in arrears and could not vote in the
Assembly. The President then said, all right, we do not vote, but I am going
to declare every resolution that comes before the Assembly adopted unless
somebody asks for a vote, and several important resolutions were thus
adopted. Near the end of the session, however, Albania asked for a vote.
The United States did not know what to do about it. It said all right, we can
vote, as this is an administrative decision, not a substantive one. This idea
to give up voting was soon accepted by everybody, and at each session of
the General Assembly many decisions are adopted without vote.
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Another dangerous situation occurred when the first Declaration on the
Environment was discussed at a Stockholm conference in 1972. This was
the first international conference in which the People's Republic of China
participated. Its delegates came with the instructions that all their proposals
must be included in the document; if the conference adopts every one of
their proposals, they would accept the document. They got every one of
their changes put somewhere in the document, except one of them which
other delegates refused to accept. The Swedish President of the Conference
announced: "All of you have seen the final draft, and I think there is a
general consensus that this declaration should be adopted." The Chinese
delegate waved his hand, but the President was unfortunately looking in the
other direction. "I see no objections. The Declaration is now adopted. Oh,
I see the Chinese delegate has something to say." The Chinese delegate
simply stated that he wanted to ask for a vote, but now it was too late to ask
for one; he did not request that another decision be taken.
Finally, it must be remembered that it was agreed for a long time that
international law is based on the agreement or acceptance by states; the states
are the masters of the house. The states can decide how they are to reach
a decision on a rule of international law. When communications were bad
and powers of negotiators were limited, each decision had to be taken back
home and approved by the ruler. Today delegates can get a change in
instructions by fax in a few minutes. The states in their wisdom decided a
few years ago that international law can be adopted by consensus, if there
is enough agreement. Of course, consensus is not instantaneous. Commit-
tees are established, they draft something, they send it to the states for
comment, they revise it in light of these comments. If there are still a few
countries that do not like something, the leaders of the conference negotiate
with them until they are more or less satisfied, and by the time the
consultations are finished, everybody has contributed to the final result, and
it has become a truly common instrument. They have done so much work,
there is no need to vote.
Sometimes states are stubborn, like the United States was with respect to
the Law of the Sea. The President of the Conference, Tommy Koh, the
Ambassador of Singapore, was still negotiating the last few things the United
States wanted to have accepted by the developing countries, when a U.S.
delegate was sent to notify him that the White House requested that
negotiations be closed, and that a vote must be taken. The United States was
the only one to reject the provisions on seabed mining; other objectors
abstained and a few other negative votes related to different topics. This is
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one of the cases where there was no success, except for the fact that the
United States was not able to stay away from the convention. Under
pressure from the fishing industry, President Reagan had to accept by an
executive order, as "generally accepted rules of customary international law,"
the convention's provisions on the exclusive economic zone, and extended
U.S. jurisdiction two hundred miles into the sea. Later the President had to
issue a second executive order, saying that, in accordance with the Conven-
tion, the United States decided to claim a 12-mile territorial sea. In both
cases the United States based its decision on the fact that these provisions,
because of general consensus, have become customary.
To summarize, States can agree on international law being made in any
way they wish. Once they agree on a method, the matter is over. As I have
pointed out, every few years we invent a new method; there is no end to
ingenuity of human beings. By the year 2000, there might be one or two
more methods. We are still applying the 19th century rule that international
law is made by the community of states, but in every generation the
community has been able to invent new methods for crystallizing internation-
al law. We finally have accepted the principle that it is important to be able
to establish new international law quickly in certain circumstances. We
cannot wait any longer for the ratification by all states because it takes too
long. We read recently that the Security Council adopted a resolution
establishing the International Tribunal for War Crimes in Bosnia. The states
agreed: we want it done, it cannot be done quickly otherwise, we don't need
a treaty, a decision of the Security Council is sufficient. The tribunal's
statute was drafted by the Secretary-General, the Security Council approved
it, the tribunal was established. Thus, it was done, promptly and efficiently.
An important international institution was established by another new
method.
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